Integrated circuit with electromagnetic energy anomaly detection and processing

ABSTRACT

An integrated circuit includes an antenna, a die manufactured from a semiconducting material, an RF energy collection and processing device disposed on or within the die and including at least a receiver and a processing device, an input configured to supply power to said RF energy collection and processing device and an output for operative communication by said RF energy collection and processing device. The integrated circuit is configurable and operable to provide at least one of electromagnetic emission anomaly detection, tamper detection, anti-tamper monitoring, degradation monitoring, health monitoring, counterfeit detection, software changes monitoring, firmware changes monitoring and monitoring of other RF energy anomalies.

CROSS REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATION

This patent application is related to and claims priority from U.S.Provisional Patent Application Ser. No. 61/464,262 filed Mar. 2, 2011and U.S. Provisional Patent Application Ser. No. 61/574,250 filed Jul.29, 2011 respectively and being incorporated into this document byreference thereto. This application is further closely related to aco-pending U.S. Ser. No. 13/410,797 entitled “SYSTEM AND METHOD FORPHYSICALLY DETECTING COUNTERFEIT ELECTRONICS”, published as U.S. Pub.No. 2012-0226463 A1 on Sep. 6, 2012. This application is being assignedto the assignee of the present invention and the disclosure of thisco-pending application is hereby incorporated by reference thereto.

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FIELD OF THE INVENTION

The present invention relates, in general, to integrated circuits and,more particularly, the instant invention is related to integratedcircuit with electromagnetic energy anomaly detection and processing.

BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION

Detection of anomalous circuit characteristics is the domain of bothquality control as well as trusted computing. This is a trend intechnology to ensure that devices being used in an application are theintended devices. In addition detection of anomalous circuitcharacteristics can be accomplished using different modalities, andseveral of these modalities have not been described previously for thispurpose.

Miniaturization and Integration are continuing trends in technology thatdecrease the size of a device while maintaining its operationalcharacteristics. When applied to electronic diagnostic equipment, thiscan allow for the more convenient use of that equipment, the moreefficient use of space in space constrained environments, andretrofitting.

The components used in circuit boards are especially susceptible tocounterfeiting and tampering. Counterfeit electronic and electricalcomponents have found their way into the supply chain in increasingnumbers. Counterfeiting occurs at the die, part, device, board and fullyassembled product level. With the increasing complexity ofcounterfeiting and circuit tampering new detection and mitigationoptions have been needed for some time.

Prior to the conception and design of the instant invention, effortshave been made to inspect and screen counterfeits. However, a solutionhas not existed to detect if a counterfeit component was introduced ontoa circuit board during rework or to have an on-board mechanism thatcould detect the installation of a counterfeit whether that counterfeitwas introduced during the manufacturing process or at a later stage.

Prior to the instant invention all of the techniques are eithersuperficial or extremely expensive and none of them are installedin-situ with the circuitry that needs to be monitored. Of superficialtechniques, the simplest is visual inspection, but as counterfeits havebecome increasing sophisticated these techniques have become lessreliable. In contrast, reliable techniques that are in existence areexpensive or are destructive in nature.

One of the methods of choice for tampering with the integrated circuitat a die level, is the Focused Ion Beam (FIB). An astute reverseengineer can use FIBs to create, modify, or remove connections within anintegrated computational or data storage asset to affect its operation.Whether these changes are malicious or simply part of a manufacturer'sapproach to cost savings, capabilities of detecting any modifications orchanges to parts are of the utmost importance.

As noted, FIBs are a very effective tool to modify integrated circuits.The ability of these systems to ablate dielectric, metal, and substratesby bombarding the surface with Ge⁺ ions can cut electrical connections,create additional unauthorized features, and implant ions to creategates and transistors. FIBs can also be used in conjunction with gassources to deposit layers of metal or other dielectrics using avariation on ion induced chemical vapor deposition. This gives atalented engineer the ability to deconstruct a non-volatilecomputational die (such as one found in a CPLD [Complex ProgrammableLogic Device] or FPGA) and adjust the bit patterns or hard-wired circuitelements. However, there are some tell-tale signs of using FIBs tomodify a semiconductor die.

FIBs are inherently destructive as they irrevocably affect thecrystalline structure of the die on which they are used, and result inan amorphous structure when used for deeper milling, especially withsilicon. 1) FIBs inevitably leave a Ga⁺ doping residue embedded in thesubstrate. 2) For buried devices or lines, one must first mill, thenmodify the device, then refill the dielectric. This changes propagation,permittivity, and group delay of internal signals as well as radiatedemissions.

From a computational point of view, these modifications may notnecessarily affect the noticeable digital operation of the device inquestion, though they certainly could introduce additional delays, andaffect timing constraints. From the point of view of electromagneticemissions, however, these introduced defects are precisely the sort ofthings that affect trace (and consequently radiator) length, engineeredelectromagnetic interference (EMI) protection, grounding and terminatingresistors, carefully controlled transistor junction length andtransconductance, specific dielectric permittivity, isolation ofintentionally suppressed or inherent low-level electromagneticemissions, etc. In fact, even effects introduced by inherent processvariations are so pronounced within modern technology nodes that themodeling and iterative analysis to control these effects are nowconsidered the most difficult element of the design process. Forexample, even modest levels of increased capacitance (femtofarad levels)generated from line width variations during manufacturing are capable ofincreasing crosstalk, ground bounce and delay at appreciable levels inmodern circuits. In the spectral domain, this can drastically affect thestrength, frequency, phase, harmonic content, and bandwidth of anemission. In the time and time-frequency domain, the phenomenology canbe even more distinctive.

Thus, there is a need for a device capable of detecting anomalies due tocounterfeiting, aging, discrete events that may degrade a component ortampering at the part and a die level of the integrated circuit or othercomplex semiconductor based devices and assemblies.

SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION

This present invention discloses novel application of utilizingunintended emissions to detect anomalous circuit characteristics thatcan be caused intentionally (e.g., substituting counterfeit parts forgenuine or authentic parts; tampering with a genuine device to introduceunauthorized functionality; replacing genuine functionality with stubfunctionality) in a miniaturized and integrated fashion orunintentionally such as aging of parts by natural or intentionallyinduced processes, part degradation that may be induced environmentallyor due to special events. As miniaturization and integration becomesmore successful, it allows for this additional capability to beincorporated into new devices and to add this constant monitoringcapability to existing devices by taking advantage of unused space thatwas heretofore unusable. Miniaturization also makes parts moresusceptible to aging, environmental effects and damage from events suchas reverse polarity, lightning strikes etc., making this technology moreimportant as the protected and protective devices co-miniaturize.

The invention further provides an integrated circuit including anantenna, a die manufactured from a semiconducting material, an RF energycollection and processing means disposed on or within said die andincluding at least a receiver and a processing means, an inputconfigured to supply power to said RF energy collection and processingmeans and an output for operative communication by said RF energycollection and processing means. The integrated circuit is configurableand operable to provide at least one of tamper detection, anti-tampermonitoring, degradation monitoring, health monitoring, counterfeitdetection, software changes monitoring, firmware changes and monitoring.

The invention also provides a stand alone integrated circuit that can beinstalled on or near electronic parts of interest to monitor theemissions of nearby parts to track degradation, tampering,counterfeiting during rework or any other anomalous changes to thecircuit.

OBJECTS OF THE INVENTION

It is therefore an object of the invention to provide an integratedcircuit with electromagnetic energy anomaly detection and processing.

Another object of the invention is to differentiate counterfeitintegrated circuits from genuine integrated circuits on the basis oftheir unintended emissions.

Another object of the invention is to detect anomalies and differentiatebetween anomalies that are caused intentionally and those that are dueto circuit aging.

Another object of the invention is to detect tampering of integratedcircuits.

A further object of the invention is to detect tampering caused byfocused ion beams (FIBs) and other technology for revising integratedcircuit.

Another object of the invention is to detect tampering of a circuitboard due to tampered parts introduced to the board.

Yet another object of the invention is to detect electromagneticsignature changes in a device when the software operating on the devicechanges.

Another object of the invention is to detect if the software installedin an integrated circuit has changed.

A further object of the invention is to detect electromagnetic signaturechanges in a device when the software operating any subassembly orcomponent on the device changes.

Yet another object of the invention is the detection of firmware changesin an integrated circuit.

Another object of the invention is the detection of software changes atthe board level.

Another object of the invention is the detection of embedded softwarechanges.

Another object of the invention is to miniaturize the sensors andcomputational requirements for this technology such that they can beintegrated at multiple levels with the device being protected.

A further object of the invention is to enable retrofitting existingsystems with integrated anti-anomaly systems.

Still another object of the invention is to enable continuous monitoringof protected systems for intrusion detection.

Yet another object of the invention is to detect counterfeit deviceswhen they are introduced into a larger subassembly after servicing.

It is an object of the invention to reduce the vulnerability of devicesto introduction of unauthorized functionality.

Another object of the invention is to reduce the vulnerability ofdevices to the elimination of trusted computing functionality.

Yet another object of the invention is to detect software intrusionsthat degrade functionality.

Another object of the invention is to detect software intrusions thatadd functionality, frequency to already available functionality or alteralready available functionality.

Yet another object of the invention is to integrate anomaly detection atthe die level.

A further object of the invention is to reduce vulnerability of devicesto the elimination of embedded security measures.

An additional object of the invention is to provide both large scale andlocalized anomaly detection.

A further object of the invention is to provide an anomaly detection anddiscrimination method and apparatus that can be enhanced bycomplementary indicators.

Yet a further object of the invention is to detect anomalies in multipleintegrated circuits simultaneously.

Still a further object of the invention is to detect tampering inmultiple integrated circuits simultaneously. Another object of theinvention is to detect and report anomalies to the circuit beingprotected.

A further object of the invention is to detect and report anomalies tothe subsystem housing the anomalous integrated circuit.

Still another object of the invention is to improve the reliability ofanti-counterfeit measures.

Yet another object of the invention is to improve the reliability ofanti-tamper measures.

Another object of the invention is to monitor nearby electronics on aboard for any anomalies.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

FIG. 1 is a schematic block diagram of an integrated circuit withelectromagnetic energy anomaly detection and processing constructed inaccordance with one embodiment of the invention;

FIG. 2 is a schematic block diagram of an integrated circuit withelectromagnetic energy anomaly detection and processing constructed inaccordance with another embodiment of the invention and furtherincorporating the integrated circuit of FIG. 1;

FIG. 3 is another schematic block diagram of an integrated circuit withelectromagnetic energy anomaly detection and processing constructed inaccordance with another embodiment of the invention and furtherincorporating the integrated circuit of FIG. 1;

FIGS. 4 a-4 c illustrate spatial relationship of the components of theintegrated circuit of FIG. 2;

FIG. 5 is a schematic block diagram of a printed circuit board assemblyemploying the integrated circuit of FIG. 1 or 2;

FIG. 6 is a schematic block diagram of a device incorporating theprinted circuit board assembly of FIG. 5;

FIG. 7 is a schematic block diagram of the integrated circuit of FIG. 1in combination with a robotic arm or wand;

FIG. 8 is a schematic block diagram of a system for inspecting orscreening electrical or electronic devices;

FIG. 9 is a schematic block diagram of the system of FIG. 8,particularly illustrating the precision signal input and a testapparatus;

FIG. 10 is a planar view a test fixture employed within system of FIG.8; and

FIG. 11 is a flow chart of a method for inspecting or screeningelectrical or electronic devices.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE VARIOUS EMBODIMENTS OF THE INVENTION

Prior to proceeding to the more detailed description of the presentinvention it should be noted that, for the sake of clarity andunderstanding, identical components which have identical functions havebeen identified with identical reference numerals throughout the severalviews illustrated in the drawing figures.

For the sake of reader's convenience, the following description isrepeated from the co-pending U.S. Ser. No. 13/410,797 entitled “SYSTEMAND METHOD FOR PHYSICALLY DETECTING COUNTERFEIT ELECTRONICS”, publishedas U.S. Pub. No. 2012-0226463 A1 on Sep. 6, 2012. Now in a reference toFIGS. 8-11, there is provided a system, generally designated as 10, fordifferentiating between a counterfeit and genuine condition of anelectrically powered device 2. The device 2 includes but is not limitedto at least one of a discrete component, integrated circuit (IC),circuit board, circuit board assembly populated with electroniccomponents, subsystem, system, electronic device and electrical deviceusing electronic components for operation. All of these devices, underpower, emit energy, either intended or unintended.

The foregoing description will be focused on emission of electromagneticenergy and, more particularly, the emission of electromagnetic energybeing in a Radio Frequency (RF) spectrum, which is typically referred toin the art as frequencies below 300 GHZ, although infrared andinfrasonic emissions are also contemplated by the instant invention.

The described invention takes advantage of the fact that all electricalcomponents, when powered, give off electromagnetic emissions. Theemissions are defined by the radiating structures that are doing theemissions.

The electromagnetic emissions will change due to anomalies that mayoccur over time to include, but not limited to aging, degradation,counterfeiting or tampering. The electromagnetic emissions changes arenot only limited to hardware changes, but also software or firmwarechanges. These changes in software in a die, integrated circuit, nearbypart on a board or several nearby parts on a board can be intentional orunintentional. Whatever the cause the described instant inventionsignificantly contemplates detection, monitoring, inspecting andscreening for both hardware and software changes from a knownanticipated state.

There must be a source of energy that energizes the electroniccomponent, board, system or subsystem to be tested or monitored. Themechanism of energizing can be simply powering the device, inputting anoscillating signal into the device or illuminating the device withelectromagnetic energy. The directly injected or connected oscillatingsignal and illumination source can be a single tone, multiple tones ormultiple frequencies or complex with modulation and or timing parametersapplied.

The typical on-board component in an operational state already has allof the inputs preconfigured whether it be a die, integrated circuit oran entire board itself. A preferred embodiment encompasses the use ofthe invention for the diagnostic or test modes of a device as well asthe fully up and functional mode of the device.

The energized item that is being inspected, tested or monitored directlyor indirectly must provide a mechanism for transmission of the energythat is being radiated which is governed by the internal design of theitem being inspected. Typically, the source that powers the device isthe energy which powers the electronics though as noted it can be anoscillating signal such as a clock, clock signal, signal, frequencyinput, frequency reference, signal generator, frequency generator orother oscillating sources that are known in the art. The mechanisms andstructures that transfer the energy to a radiating element within theitem being tested are integrated circuit dies, wire bonds, semiconductortraces, board traces, wires, cables or structural capacitive orinductive coupling.

The radiating element may be an intentionally radiating antenna or anunintended antenna that due to physical dimensions acts as a reasonableantenna. If the internal parts of the electronics, whether they are adiscrete semiconductor, integrated circuit, printed circuit board,circuit board assembly or product, are functioning differently, the partwill give off a different electromagnetic signature and counterfeitparts can be differentiated from genuine parts for inspection orscreening purposes.

The system 10 includes means, generally designated as 18 for determiningsuch condition of the electrically powered device 2, the conditiondefined by an emission characteristics (or signature) of RF energy 4from the device 2 under test or inspection.

One essential element of the means 18 is a first means or emissionsdetection apparatus, generally designated as 20, which, in accordancewith a presently preferred embodiment, is provided for at least one ofsensing, processing, and algorithmically matching at least one emissionof the RF energy for at least one of inspecting and screening theelectronic device.

The detailed description and operation of the first means 20 are bestshown and described in the U.S. Pat. No. 7,515,094 and in U.S. Pat. No.8,063,813, both issued to Keller, III; in the U.S. patent applicationSer. No. 12/551,635 filed on Sep. 1, 2009 and entitled “ADVANCEMANUFACTURING MONITORING AND DIAGNOSTIC TOOL”; and in the U.S. patentapplication Ser. No. 13/344,717 filed on Jan. 6, 2012 and entitled“System and Method for Physically Detecting, Identifying, Diagnosing AndGeolocating Devices Connectable To A Network”, published as U.S. Pub.No. 2012-0179812 A1 on Jul. 12, 2012, all owned by the assignee of theinstant invention and whose teachings are incorporated herein byreference thereto.

The first means 20 includes RF collection means coupled to an antenna22. It would be understood that the RF collection means 20 includes areceiver that can be a general receiver or tuner and the generalreceiver can be a heterodyne or superheterodyne receiver.

Many receiver embodiments are contemplated as a component of the RFenergy collection apparatus to include as noted heterodyne orsuperheterodyne receivers, wideband crystal video receivers, tuned Radiofrequency crystal video receivers, narrowband scanning superheterodynereceivers, channelized receivers, microscan receivers, acousto-opticreceivers and the vast array of tuner technologies that may often bereferred to as synonymous with receivers.

In another embodiment the highly sensitive RF energy collectionapparatus is a cryogenically cooled receiver.

The receiver can be improved by providing a broadband response. Thoughone embodiment focuses on emissions from 100 KHz to 6 GHZ the bandwidthcan be reduced to 30 MHz to 1 GHz to capture the majority of emissionsfrom the devices coming in to the facility.

Further sensitivity is achieved by lowering the noise figure of thesystem. In one embodiment the receiver has a modified front end with aLow Noise Amplifier (LNA) with an ultra-low noise figure.

In one embodiment the system has a noise figure of less than 5. Inanother embodiment the system has a noise figure of less than 1. Inanother embodiment the system has a noise figure less than 0.1.

From the receiver, the signature data will be sent to a processor. Oneembodiment is direct analog analysis. Though direct analog analysis is adescribed embodiment, the presently preferred manifestation is to use ananalog to digital conversion (not shown) to convert the analog output ofthe receiver to digital output. The digital output is then sent to asignal processing apparatus.

One embodiment uses direct analysis of the analog signal into a digitaloutput.

Another embodiment, where higher frequencies are required, utilizes adown conversion of the analog output prior to conversion to a digitalsignal.

In one embodiment, the highly sensitive receiver further uses DigitalSignal Processing (DSP) to further enhance the sensitivity of thereceiver.

In another embodiment, the RF energy collection apparatus utilizes DSPfiltering techniques to prepare the collected data for furtherprocessing by DSP algorithms.

One embodiment uses a Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) to improvesensitivity of the receiver.

In another embodiment the FFT utilizes in excess of 1 Million points.

In another embodiment the FFT is implemented on an embedded chip withinthe RF collection apparatus.

Now in a further reference to FIG. 9, preferably, such antenna 22 is anantenna array positioned a predetermined distance 23 above the device 2.When the device 2 is a small discrete component or an integratedcircuit, the antenna array 22 is positioned stationary relative to thedevice 2 under test. The elements of the antenna array 22 are weightedvia electronic steering to optimize the energy collected from certainparts of the circuit board or larger item under test. In the case of asingle component that is being tested no weighting is necessary or itcould be weighted to enhance signature amplitude from the location ofthe component. In this embodiment the antenna array 22 providesconstructive interference of the antenna pattern of each antenna in thearray when the element is weighted to constructively enhance the gain ondifferent areas of the board of interest to inspect individual parts ona board without the need for mechanical or robotic steering. When thedevice 2 is of a larger size, for example such as a printed circuitboard assembly populated with electronic components, a single antennaelement or much smaller number of elements integrated to the end of therobotic arm 32 or a compact version of the antenna array 22 ispositioned for movement, by way of an electronically controlledmechanical or robotic steering, over the surface of such printed circuitboard or the printed circuit board is mounted for movement beneath theantenna array 22.

The antenna array 22 also includes an integrated Low Noise Amplifier(LNA) 25. The advantage of integrating LNA 25 is in enhanced sensitivityof the entire system and enhanced level of the signatures given off bythe device 2. The antenna 22 and LNA 25 may be mounted within anintegrated circuit (IC) to perform electronically steered detection ofcounterfeits. To further enhance emission signatures, a low noiseamplifier 25 with a noise figure of less than one can be employed tobetter approach the theoretical room temperature sensitivity of thesystem 10.

In another embodiment, a compact antenna array 22 with integrated LNAs25 or a single compact antenna 22 that is approximately the size of thecomponents one wishes to inspect on a board with a single element may beintegrated onto a robotic arm 32 for inspection of electronic items.

In yet another embodiment, the antenna/LNA array tips suitable for arobotic arm 32 may be interchangeable based on the performanceparameters sought for the inspection of certain electronic devices orcomponents.

The predetermined distance 23 essentially depends on the desired successrate of detecting counterfeit devices, the type of devices beinginspected or screened and the sensitivity of the antenna array 22 andthe RF collection means 20.

For the case of detecting electronics outright or identifying electronicdevices at range most of the radiative energy components are attenuatedto a level that makes them extremely challenging to detect. When thegoal is to screen or inspect for counterfeit electronics, the detectionapparatus can be placed at extremely close range to the components,boards or systems being tested. This invention focuses on thatenvironment and the advantages of the extra information provided aboutthe electronics being screened or inspected when in the near environmentof the RF collection means. Accordingly, it is presently preferred toposition the end of the antenna array 22 between about one micrometerand about one centimeter from the surface of the device 2. Furthermore,the invention contemplates use of an active illumination source 38configured to illuminate the device 2 that is at least one of detected,inspected or screened with free field RF energy to further enhance theemissions signature of the device 2 under test.

When antenna array 22 is mounted for stationary electronic steering ofthe beams of the array or for movement relative to the device 2 undertest, the means 18 provides an automated mechanism 30 for collecting theRF energy from the device 2. By way of one example only, such automatedmechanism 30 includes a robotic arm 32 and a general controller 34configured to control movement of the robotic arm 32. The automatedmechanism 30 may further include a sensor 36 for setting suchpredetermined distance 23, particularly, when components within thedevice 2, for example such as a printed circuit board assembly, havevariable heights.

It is to be understood that such automated mechanism 30 for control ofthe robotic arm 32 used to position the means for collecting the RFenergy may be provided as a stand alone system or may be incorporatedinto a manufacturing line (not shown) for a printed circuit boardassembly or any apparatus that allows for at least one of input, outputand power connections.

It is to be further understood that although the positioning of theantenna array 22 or a single element antenna above the device 2 undertest is depicted to be in the vertical direction other orientations andmanipulations can be undertaken by the robotic arm to access difficultto reach spaces in fully assembled products or complex assemblies. Inanother embodiment, different orientation of the antenna array 22 may beutilized based on an assessment that the device 2 being inspected tendsto radiate the RF energy being collected from that direction. Itfollows, based on the conventional wisdom in the art, other specialorientations are also contemplated by the instant invention for a numberof other test specific orientations.

Unlike conventional full electrical tests, the instant invention isbased on activating limited or baseline functionality of the device 2 inorder to screen for and inspect for counterfeits. In the case of circuitboard, printed circuit board assembly or partially or fully assembledproducts, typically it is sufficient to provide power to the board. Allof the inputs and outputs are not necessary, though clearly thoseskilled in the art would be aware that connecting all of the inputs andoutputs might potentially serve to improve the statistical screeningsuccess of the instant invention. The board in this state will undertakeit's basic functions and the RF emissions collection means 20 is able tocollect enough differentiable information to screen for counterfeits andtell if the board itself is genuine or a counterfeit and if a specificcomponent on the board is a counterfeit.

Now in a further reference to FIG. 8, in the case of components/device 2that are intended to be integrated into a circuit board prior to theboard existing manufacturing line, one embodiment is directed to simplyproviding power signal 42 to the component/device 2 so as to onlyelectrically turn the component or board ON. Another embodiment isdirected to only providing an oscillatory signal 44, preferably toenergize the clock in input or output of the device 2 under test. In thepresently preferred embodiment of the invention, the power signal 42 iscombined with the oscillatory signal 44. Such oscillatory signal 44 ispreferably a monotonic oscillating signal, but can be also provided as amulti-tone input or a modulating or modulated oscillating signal. Theuse of multi-tone input injection aids in developing cross-modulated andintermodulated responses that translate into unique signatures for acounterfeit versus a genuine device. Furthermore, use of multi-toneinjection aids in developing non-linear responses that translate intounique signatures for counterfeit versus genuine devices.

The method of energizing the device 2 with a power input signal 42 andoscillator input 44 applies to semiconductor devices, integratedcircuits, board level devices such as surface mount or through wholeparts, sub-boards or daughter boards, entire circuits boards, assembliesof multiple boards or even whole products. Of importance, is to providepower input 42 to power the device 2 as a baseline and a single simplemonotonic oscillatory input 44 to energize basic device functions thatwill then, when active, create electromagnetic emissions for capture bythe RF collection means 20 and antenna array 22 or individual antennapositioned in the near vicinity to the device 2 and analyzed against anexpected standard or baseline characteristics of a genuine part.

In an example of the device 2 being the IC part, the power input 42 willturn the IC ON and the oscillating input 44 will enable internalcircuitry by providing an oscillatory input into a pin or port on an ICspecification sheet that is often referred to as a clock input or ClockIn, but would not cause more complex operation of the IC, since no otherinputs are being energized. Another example would be providing theoscillatory input only signal, communications or secondary clock inputswith the primary focus on energizing the underlying circuitry of the IC.

Accordingly, the system 10 provides a power signal source 46 and anoscillator signal source 48. The oscillator signal source 48 may betermed as crystal oscillator, ceramic oscillator, oscillator, timestandard, signal, signal generator, frequency reference or other similarterms in that are typical in the art. Although each of these sources mayhave differences when analyzed in detail, each of them fundamentallyprovides a mechanism to provide an oscillatory input to the device 2.

It has been found that the manner in which the integrated circuitresponds is dependent on the quality of the oscillator input 44 that isused to drive either the clock inputs or the signal inputs of thesemiconductor device 2.

Satisfactory results have been achieved by using temperature compensatedCrystal Oscillator (TCXO), microcomputer compensated Crystal Oscillators(MXCO), Oven Controlled Crystal Oscillator (OCXO), small atomicfrequency standards (Rubidium (Rb) and Rubidium Oscillators (RbXO)), andhigh performance atomic standards such as Cs all provide accuracy inexcess of 10⁻⁴. In the presently preferred embodiment the precision ofthe oscillating signal 44 exceeds 10⁻⁸, and the source 48 is a smallatomic frequency standard oscillator. Thus, the oscillator input source48 is hereafter referred to as a “high precision signal source” and theoscillator input 44 is hereafter referred to as “high precisionoscillator signal”. The high precision signal further has a frequencythereof being consistent with input requirements of the device 2.

The oscillator source 48 described above needs only be used to energizethe device 2. Though more spectrally rich emissions can be derived byadding modulations or complex timings to the manner in which the deviceis driven, the presently preferred embodiment limits complexity to onlyenergizing the device input such as the clock or other signal input andcreating an emissions pattern that provides information as to whetherthe condition of the device 2 is genuine or counterfeit.

Another embodiment provides a second mechanism for allowing theoscillator source 48 to sweep over a frequency band while providing ameans to measure the emissions of the device 2 simultaneously. Oneembodiment has the frequency sweep occurring continuously. Anotherembodiment uses a discretized sweep where only certain predetermineddiscrete frequencies over the band of interest are swept. The frequencyswept over will depend on the anticipated inputs of the device 2 undertest. In some cases it may suffice to sweep over several Hz, others KHzof bandwidth, others MHz of bandwidth and others GHz of bandwidth. Theinvention is capable of covering any of these ranges, but for costconcerns the bandwidth is typically limited to ranges that areeffective, but not exhaustive. It is clearly contemplated that any ofthese bandwidth intervals could be used and are anticipated by theinvention.

In addition, the instant invention contemplates energizing inputsoutside of the range specific of the device being driven. In this case,the genuine part may have been developed to have a wider input rangethan actually specified to provide a more robust part whereas thecounterfeit part may not have that capability. In either case, responsessuch as non-linear responses that differ between the parts are readilytranslated to an adequately configured RF collection means 20.

Further complemented by this invention is the altering of the amplitudeof oscillator input to device inputs such as clock inputs, signal inputsand other inputs that may have been defined by the manufacturer of thedevice 2.

In another embodiment the amplitude is not only altered, but amplitudemodulation is applied.

In addition to energizing inputs, the instant invention contemplatesenergizing output(s). Driving the outputs also creates devicearchitecture responses. For instance, a genuine part might havefiltering or Electrostatic Discharge (ESD) protection in the device thata counterfeit part does not have. The counterfeit part may “light uplike a Christmas tree” in the RF spectrum when some standard protectionis not included in the circuits by a counterfeiter who is trying to savecosts.

When the device 2 is a printed circuit board, printed circuit boardassembly or any larger device, the invention contemplates simplyconnecting power input 42 to the device without the need to drive any ofthe other inputs or outputs of the device. The invention also clearlycontemplates the use of power input 42 and oscillator input 44 torespective inputs (or outputs) of such device 2. For smaller components,such as discrete semiconductors, integrated circuits and the like, theinstant invention provides a test fixture 50, best shown in FIGS. 7 and9-10, which provides means for transferring such input 42 and 44 to thedevice 2. For example, such test fixture 50 may be a zero insertionforce socket configured to receive such device 2 and preconfigured toapply such input 42 and 44 thereto. In another example, the test fixture50 may be any specialized apparatus that facilitates an effective manneror applying power to the power pin and an oscillating signal to otherdesired inputs (or outputs). Grounds are also typically connected aswell. Or, the test fixture 50 may simply provide two surface levelcontacts 56, 58 and means for temporarily securing the device 2positioned thereon. For example, such temporarily securing means may bea vacuum generating device 57 positioned below the surface 55 of thetest fixture 50.

A second essential element of the means 18 is means 24 for comparing andmatching the collected RF energy to a set of parameters identified for abaseline configuration of a genuine device 2. It would be understoodthat means 24 includes at least one processor, though it alsocontemplates other hardware or firmware manifestations of verifying amatch with the anticipated parameters.

Means 24 includes at least one algorithm to match the data collected tothe expected signature for the device 2. The presently preferredembodiment uses more than one automated algorithm. The presentlypreferred embodiment utilizes several algorithms that match mutuallyexclusive parameters of the RF energy emission signature. In this mannerthe ability to match the collected signature to the expected signatureis improved. The weighting of these algorithms favorably improves theability to detect poor quality parts to include counterfeit parts.

Thus, means 24 includes at least one of Harmonic Analysis, MatchedFilter, non-harmonic correlation, timing correlation, Artificial NeuralNetworks (ANN), specifically multilayer perception (MLP) feed-forwardANN with back propagation (BP), Wavelet Decomposition, Autocorrelation,Spectral Feature Measurements or Statistics, Clustering or PhaseDetrending algorithms.

In the clustering analysis, statistics are measured and generated on keyelectromagnetic emissions of the sampled components. A total of Nstatistics are measured on each of M components, in turn, to develop Msets of N statistics. Each statistic is then assigned a unique axis inN-dimensional space and the measured statistics for each of the Mmeasured components are stored. A Hierarchical Agglomerative Clustering(HAC) algorithm is then applied to segregate clusters in the spatialdistribution. The identified clusters represent component sets thatdiffer in their performance parameters beyond the typical distributionin manufacturing. Any illegitimate components inserted into the sampledset are necessarily revealed as a separate cluster in the analysis.

The HAC algorithm operates iteratively, wherein successive iterationsagglomerate (merge) the closest pair of clusters (or data points, on thefirst iteration) by satisfying some similarity criteria. Typically, thissimilarity is defined by a measure of distance between clusters.However, many of the measured features, which represent the axis inN-dimensional space, are distinct and unrelated. The MahalanobisDistance, a metric which corrects for dissimilar scales through anassessment of covariance, conceived for this exact purpose and is usedas the basis of similarity between clusters in this analysis. TheMahalanobis distance d({right arrow over (x)}, {right arrow over (y)})is defined between two vectors {right arrow over (x)} and{right arrowover (y)} as,d({right arrow over (x)},{right arrow over (y)})=√{square root over(({right arrow over (x)}−{right arrow over (y)})^(T))}S ⁻¹({right arrowover (x)}−{right arrow over (y)}),

where S is an estimate of the joint covariance between the two vectors.In the current application, each vector is represented by a positionvector in N-space, and the joint covariance between two clusters isestimated from their constituent data points. Normalizing to the jointcovariance matrix of the two clusters gives the Mahalanobis distance theessential property of scale-invariance.

Clusters are extended bodies in N-dimensional space, this requires thatthe distance metric endpoints be well-defined. While there are several“linkage” options available, such as the minimum data point distancebetween two clusters (termed single linkage) or the maximum point-wisedistance (termed maximal linkage), the place to put the ruler endpointsis at the mean of each cluster in N-space. This linkage method allowsthe covariance of each cluster to be considered in the Mahalanobisdistance metric. It also reduces the computation necessary, sincecluster means can be updated in a running fashion without having toiterate over all the constituent data points.

The stopping criterion of the algorithm (i.e. the separation distancethreshold which precludes further agglomeration) is determined throughan assessment of the manufacturing tolerances observed during analysis.Clusters are developed and nested by similarity in multiple tiers and ananalysis of these tiers provides insight into the existing variance.

Information loss, as the number of clusters increases is used toidentify the optimal stopping criterion. The SymmetrizedKullback-Liebler Divergence (SKLD) is a prime measure of informationloss. The SKLD is defined for two models P and Q as,

$D\left( {{P\left. Q \right)} = {{\sum\limits_{i}\;{{P(i)}\log\frac{P(i)}{Q(i)}}} + {\sum\limits_{i}\;{{Q(i)}\log{\frac{Q(i)}{P(i)}.}}}}} \right.$

The SKLD provides a measurement of the information difference betweentwo models (i.e. two tiers of HAC). Plotting D(P∥Q) for several tiersusually illustrates an inflection point. The optimal number of clustersis identified just below the inflection point.

Now in a further reference to FIG. 11, the method of inspecting orscreening for counterfeit electronic or electrical device 2 starts withpowering the device 2 at step 80, inputting power signal in step 82 andinputting an oscillating signal at step 84. Then, the RF collectionmeans 20 is positioned in step 86 and is operable to collect RFemissions, in step 88, from the device 2 injected with power signal 42and oscillating signal 44. Collected RF emissions are computationallyprocessed at step 90 which includes the step of comparing and matchingsignatures of collected RF emissions 4 with RF emission signaturecharacteristics for a genuine device 2 determine by various methods, forexample sampling of a plurality of devices 2, manufacturingspecifications and the like methods.

It is contemplated to use various automated algorithms within the step90. The step 90 may include the step of obtaining discrete wavelettransform coefficient statistics or the step of obtaining relative phasemeasurement and comparing obtained phase measurement to anticipatedphase measurements. Step 90 may also include the step of using at leastone of a clustering algorithm a Hierarchical Agglomerative Clustering(HAC) algorithm.

The Wavelet transform is a multi-resolution analysis technique employedto obtain the time-frequency representation of an analyzed emission. Itis an alternate basis function to the Fourier Transform and is based onthe expansion of the incoming signal in terms of a function, calledmother wavelet, which is translated and dilated in time. From thecomputational point of view, the Discrete Wavelet Transform (DWT)analyzes the signal by decomposing it into its ‘approximate’ and‘detail’ information, which is accomplished by using successive low-passand high-pass filtering operations respectively.

The high-pass ‘detail’ coefficient outputs of these multipledecompositions as features in signal classification have been foundadvantageous for use in the instant invention. DWT has been foundbeneficial for classifying near-identical device emissions based on ameasure of skewness obtained by applying the Wavelet Transform onfrequency domain information. DWT analysis is applied on the frequencydomain emission data of each emission within the intersection ∩Edefined. Average energy at each of the different detail-coefficientscales is computed and each resulting value shall be retained for use inclassification.

The phase information of identified emissions is used to provide aparticularly sensitive assessment of circuit modification. Signal phase(and, in turn, emission phase) is easily modified through slightvariations in either distributed or localized impedance within a givencircuit. Phase information is therefore highly relevant when seeking toidentify subtle circuit changes.

In relative phase measurement algorithm, phase measurements areperformed on each emission relative to another (or several other)emissions, due to the lack of a known reference. Any set of staticfrequency emissions are necessarily repetitive within a time-domainenvelope and, therefore, contain a repetitive phase relation at acertain point within this envelope, which is named as the reference timet_(ref). If a measurement of the signals is made at some other time,t_(M), during the repetitive envelope, the phases at t_(M) will notusually appear to correspond in any obvious way to those of t_(ref) dueto the time difference t_(ref)−t_(M). The identification of t_(ref) froma measurement made at t_(M) allows a shift of the time reference back tot_(ref) and, in turn, an alignment of the phases such that a single,repeatable measure of relative phase relation may be taken.

Nominally, harmonics are expected to have a relative phase measurementof 0°, while inter-modulation components are expected to have relativephase measurements of either 0° or 180°. Precise phase relationship ofharmonics and inter-modulation components often varies from thesenominal expectations and may be effectively used to characterizecircuitry. The deviation in relative phase from the nominal value isattributed to the small changes in circuit reactance at the varyingfrequencies of the analyzed harmonics.

Some methods rely on frequency domain phase detrending, which generallyhas drawbacks in the computational ambiguities associated with themodulo 2 pi calculations. Other methods rely on the use of a referencesignal to establish a precise reference time off of which to measure.Given these drawbacks, neither of these approaches is an optimalmethodology for emission measurement. However, when the relationship isknown a priori (that is, if the signals are harmonics—0° shifts—orinter-modulation components—0° or 180° shifts), one may minimize afunction of the difference in phase on each signal from the expectedvalues using a single time delay offset as the independent variable.This approach, taken by the inventors provides the framework to analyzethe phases of harmonic and inter-modulation emission content forvariations between measured ICs and other devices.

Each of the emission patterns identified as belonging to a harmonic orinter-modulation relationship is assessed to determine precise relativephase measures.

It has been found that the ANN algorithm excels in learning trendsoccurring in large databases, combining information in a manneroptimized to either classify or function fit.

There are several desirable aspects to neural network-driven dataanalysis. The RF emission data contains a rich and diverse set ofcharacteristic signatures for persistent monitoring and diagnosis. Toachieve the most sensitive, accurate and reliable results, as much ofthis information as possible is included in the analysis. However, thefact that the phenomenology of RF emissions consists of a combination ofbroadband and narrowband characteristics makes it difficult to determinea robust RF processing technique appropriate to the task. ANN's arehighly skilled at combining large or diverse information into easilyunderstood quantities. Additionally, simply providing ANN's with usefuldata and instructions pertaining to the desired categorization obtainssolutions to complex problems. This feature allows the use of multipleRF techniques in conjunction, utilizing all relevant information toultimately distinguish one unique signature from another.

Next at step 92, the computationally processed RF emissions arediscerned to determine condition of a genuine or counterfeit device 2.If required, the frequency setting of the oscillating signal may bechanged in step 94 and steps 84 through 92 are repeated. Each measuredresponse is stored at step 96 and the responses are compared with eachother to improve counterfeit inspection. The frequency change may beassociated with different frequency amplitude settings and/or differentrelative phases between two or more signals. When at least two inputsare injected with the oscillating input 44, the collected RF emissiondata for each input is compared individually against the expectedsignature and injection into all inputs simultaneously.

Finally, at step 98, assessment of the condition of the device 2 is madeso as to discern between genuine and counterfeit device 2. The step 98of determining the genuine device 2 includes the step of analyzing atleast one of frequency locations of emissions components, phases ofemissions, cross-modulation and inter-modulation components generated bythe internal circuitry, shape of any individual emission, qualityfactors of any individual emissions or timing characteristics ofemissions.

The presently preferred method of inspecting or screening forcounterfeit electronic or electrical device 2 further includes the stepof establishing the baseline RF characteristics representative of thegenuine device 2. Such step of establishing the baseline RFcharacteristics includes the step of large scale comparison of spectralemissions and the step of reducing the large scale comparison tonarrowband comparisons and outputting after comparison and furtherreduction to a single scalar value based on the quality of thecomparison match. The step of establishing the baseline RFcharacteristics may also include the step of obtaining local spectralpower density statistics, wherein a plurality of semiconductors aresampled and discriminated based on localized statistical featuresmeasured on each of emissions common between sampled devices. Thestatistical features include at least one of Emission FrequencyLocation, Emission Peak Magnitude, Emission Phase Noise, EmissionSymmetry, Skewness, and Emission Local Noise Floor.

This invention provides the necessary steps and specifics tosimultaneously apply power and one or more than one oscillatory inputand simultaneously measuring the RF emitted by the device 2 under theseconditions, whether that emission 4 be conducted or radiated to detect,screen, identify and inspect for counterfeit electronics.

The instant invention also uses the intended or unintended RF emissions4 to characterize devices at the die or substrate level. Theintroduction of free field EM field strengths at select frequencieswhere the device is measured to be emitting will amplify and/or alterthe unintentional radiation characteristics of the device. Thisinvention further contemplates an embodiment wherein an activeilluminating source is used to enhance the emissions collected by the RFcollection means. In this case, the power to the device being applied isapplied via the test fixture and the RF collection means collects theemitted energy. During this collection the free-field illuminationsource is turned on to energize the circuit. Another embodimentencompasses the application of power and the oscillating signal viaphysical connection to the device being tested while the free fieldillumination is carried out and the RF collection apparatus collects theemitted energy. In this embodiment the illumination source mayilluminate using single frequency monotonic, multi-tone or complexmodulated RF energy.

The introduction of EM field strengths via the illumination source atselect frequencies may amplify and/or alter the unintentional radiationcharacteristics of the device. One advantage of the instant inventionincludes amplification of the RF emission signature to improve theability to detect, inspect or screen counterfeit electronics.

The field strengths necessary to cause the described responses may nothave to be so robust. Lower field strengths in some cases may enhancethe emissions collected substantially. For example, oscillatorinstabilities at low field strengths can significantly alter theemission signature of such devices.

Now in reference to FIG. 1, the instant invention provides an integratedcircuit (IC), generally designated as 100. The IC 100 includes a die 110manufactured from a semiconducting material, for example, such as asilicon but other materials are also contemplated herein. The RF energycollection and processing means 18, including emissions detectionapparatus 20 and processing means 24, is integrated into the die 110. Adata storage means 26, such as a memory, is also provided. The antenna22 is shown as a loop antenna in FIG. 1. Other antenna types includingbut not limited to stacked loop, fractal, irregular loop, array ofdipoles, parabolic antenna shape structure, Vivaldi antenna, equiangularspiral, skewed spiral, micromachined horn or waveguide structure, andthe like devices known in the art are contemplated within the instantinvention. As it will be explained further in this document, antenna 22may be provided external to the RF energy collection and processingmeans 18 and even external to the die 110 or even the IC 100. The die110 and RF energy collection and processing means 18 may be enclosedwithin an optional enclosure member 112 in accordance with conventionaltechniques of providing functioning ICs. An input connection 114 isconfigured to supply power to the RF energy collection and processingmeans 18. In operation, input connection 114 has a connection with asource of power (not shown). An output 116 is provided for operativecommunication by the RF energy collection and processing means 18. Theoutput 116 is configurable to communicate plurality of information typesfrom the RF energy collection and processing means 18. By way of oneexample only, the output 116 may be configured to indicate two states ofthe RF energy collection and processing means 18, whereby one state isindicative of an RF energy signature substantially matching apredetermined standard and whereby a second state is indicative of theRF energy signature deviating from the predetermined standard. Output116 may be provided as an analog or digital input. A ground inputconnection 118 is also provided. The IC 100 may be further configuredwith an optional connection 120 for programming the processing means 24and/or communicating RF emission related data for storage in the memory26. Other input and output connections are contemplated based onspecific applications and requirements.

In operation, the IC 100 is simply mounted onto any suitable member, forexample, such as a substrate 206 of FIG. 2, printed circuit boardassembly 300 of FIG. 5, to be described below in this document, roboticarm 32 and the like devices containing electronic components or used fordetection of electronics components. The IC 100 is then operable inaccordance with above described embodiments in a plurality ofapplications to be described further in this document.

Now in reference to FIG. 2, therein is illustrated an IC, generallydesignated as 200. The IC 200 includes the above described RF energycollection and processing means 18, antenna 22 and inputs/outputs 112,116, 118 and 120.

The IC 200 also includes at least one circuit 210 and/or at least onediscrete component 210 a positioned in proximity to the RF energycollection and processing means 18. The antenna 22, shown by way of anexample only as a loop antenna, is mounted to encase the at least onecircuit 210 and/or at least one discrete component 210 a. As it can beseen in FIG. 2, at least one section of the antenna 22 may deviate froma straight configuration.

The at least one circuit 210 and/or at least one discrete component 210a may be provided on another die 202, wherein the RF energy collectionand processing means 18 is integrated into the die 110, or the at leastone circuit 210 and/or at least one discrete component 210 a and the RFenergy collection and processing means 18 may be integrated into thesame die 202. The IC 200 also includes a casing 204 and interconnectionsto input/output pins or terminals 212 and 214. Either or both dies 110and 202 may be mounted on the optional substrate 206.

In operation, the RF energy collection and processing means 18 isresponsive to RF electromagnetic energy emitted by at least one of theat least one circuit 210 and at least one discrete component 210 a inaccordance with above described embodiments depending on a particularapplication and/or requirements.

The instant invention contemplates that the IC 200 may be provided withmeans for destroying or disabling operability of the IC 200 in an eventof at least one of hardware, firmware or software tampering,counterfeiting and even abnormal operation. By way of one example onlyof FIG. 2, such means may be a switch 220 mounted in a path of powerbetween power input connection 214 and at least one circuit 210 and/orat least one discrete component 210 a. When RF energy collection andprocessing means 18 detects that RF electromagnetic energy emission fromthe at least one circuit and/or at least one discrete component 210deviates, due to anomaly, from a predetermined standard therefor, theprocessor 24 will trigger the switch 220 to OFF state, thus disablingsupply of power to the at least one circuit 210 and/or at least onediscrete component 210 a. If more than one other circuit is providedwithin IC 200, the switch 220 may be mounted so as to disable supply ofpower to all such other circuits. Or a plurality of switches 220 may beprovided, wherein each switch 220 is associated with a specific circuit.When a plurality of switches 220 is provided, the processor 24 may beconfigured to disable power to one, some or all circuits depending onthe detected anomaly of the IC 200. Advantageously, a separate powerinput 114 is contemplated thus enabling intended operation of the RFenergy collection and processing means 18. Or, an output 116, forexample being of a digital type, may be set by the processor 24 tocommunicate a warning to higher level assembly having capability todisable or destroy operability of the at least one circuit 210 and/or atleast one discrete component 210 a.

Now in reference to FIG. 3, IC 201 operates generally identical to theIC 200 of FIG. 2, except that the antenna 22 is positioned betweencomponents 210 a-210 b so as to monitor more than one of such componentsin addition to monitoring status of the die 202.

Now in reference to FIGS. 4 a-4 c, the instant invention contemplatesfurther various special orientations of the RF energy collection andprocessing means 18, antenna 22 and the at least one circuit 210 and/orat least one discrete component 210 a and further provides for a die 202of either a single layer or a multi layer construction, as isconventional in the art.

The embodiments of FIGS. 2-4 c are provided to detect any anomaly of theICs 200, 201. In one example, the RF energy collection and processingmeans 18 may be configured to detect tampering of the at least onecircuit 210 and/or at least one discrete component 210 a with a focusedion beam technology. In another example, the RF energy collection andprocessing means 18 may be configured to at least detect tampering withthe die 202 of the circuit 210 that is integrated and encapsulated intosame physical component packaging 204. Further, RF energy collection andprocessing means 18 may be configured to detect at least one ofmodification and tampering of software operating within the IC 200. Yetfurther, RF energy collection and processing means 18 may be configuredto detect tampering of the at least one circuit and at least onediscrete component 210. The RF energy collection and processing means 18may be also configured to only detect tampering of the die 202.

The instant invention also contemplates that at least one of the IC 100,IC 200 and IC 201 is mounted onto a device 310, such as a printedcircuit board (PCB) of a PCB assembly, generally designated as 300, asbest shown in FIG. 5. In this embodiment, the RF energy collection andprocessing means 18 is responsive to RF energy emitted by at least onecomponent 312 a-312 c on the PCB assembly 300. Several orientations ofthe RF energy collection and processing means are contemplated toinclude on-board or off-board configurations and orientations of the RFenergy collection and processing means 18. Numerous orientations andconfigurations of the antenna 22 used in conjunction with the RF energycollection and processing means 18 are also further contemplated. Forexample it is contemplated that the antenna 22 could be integrated andencapsulated in the same device package as the RF energy collection andprocessing means 18. In another configuration the RF energy processingand collection means 18 including the antenna 22 are configured as asystem on a chip. It is further contemplated that the antenna 22 couldbe etched onto the PCB assembly 300. In another contemplatedconfiguration, the antenna 22 is external to the PCB 310 and is mountedin a traditional fashion extending from the PCB 310. In yet anothercontemplated configuration, the antenna 22 is a conformal antenna thatmounts to any conformal feature of the product the PCB 310 is beingintegrated into.

The embodiment of FIG. 5 is provided to detect any anomaly of the PCBassembly 300.

In one example, the RF energy collection and processing means 18 isconfigured to detect at least one of tampering and counterfeiting of theat least one component 312 a-312 c on the PCB assembly 300. In anotherexample, RF energy collection and processing means 18 is configured todetect degradation of the at least one component 312 a-312 c. In yetanother example, RF energy collection and processing means 18 may beconfigured to continuously monitor RF energy emissions of the die 202 ofthe IC 200 and any changes to the RF energy emissions due to any factorsthat change the emissions characteristics collected by the RF energycollection means 18. Or, the RF energy collection and processing means18 may be configured to self-predict Remaining Useful Lifetime (RUL) ofat least one of die 110 and the other die 202. RF energy collection andprocessing means 18 may be also configured to detect any componentsbeing either tampered with on the PCB 310 or introduced in tampered orcounterfeited state to the PCB 310.

Now in reference to FIG. 6, the PCB assembly 300 is mounted within adevice 400 including an optional casing 402 and at least one or aplurality of additional PCB assemblies 302, 304 and 306. It would beunderstood that device 400 also defines a fully assembled device, forexample being ready for sale in retail or wholesale operations.

In this embodiment, the RF energy collection and processing means 18 isconfigured to detect at least one of tampering and counterfeiting of theat least one circuit board 300, 302, 304 and 306 or at least onecomponent mounted thereon. The RF energy collection and processing means18 may be also configured to provide health monitoring of the at leastone component 312 a-312 c on the PCB 310 that the IC 100, 200 or 201 ismounted to.

The embodiment of FIG. 6 is provided to detect any anomaly of the device400. Advantageously, the RF energy collection and processing means 18 isconfigured and operable in this embodiment to provide at least one oftamper detection, anti-tamper monitoring, degradation monitoring, healthmonitoring, counterfeit detection, software changes monitoring, firmwarechanges monitoring and failure of the device 400. RF energy collectionand processing means 18 may be configured to detect changes in theelectromagnetic signature emission due to changes in the softwareoperating the device 400 as a whole or due to any changes in softwareinstalled within the sub-assembly or component within the device 400. RFenergy collection and processing means 18 may be configured to detectfirmware changes in any integrated circuit or other component within thedevice 400. RF energy collection and processing means 18 may be alsoconfigured to destroy or disable operation of the device 400 in an eventof at least one of hardware, firmware or software tampering, either bydriving a predetermined component or generating a predetermined messageto the controller (not shown) of the device 400. It would be understoodthat more than IC 100, 200 and 201 may be provided within the device 400and configured either for independent or at least overlapping operation.

Furthermore, the IC 100, with or without antenna 22, may be mounted onthe tip 33 of the robotic arm 32 as shown in FIG. 7, which is a partialview of FIG. 2 of the co-pending U.S. Ser. No. 13/410,797 entitled“SYSTEM AND METHOD FOR PHYSICALLY DETECTING COUNTERFEIT ELECTRONICS”,published as U.S. Pub. No. 2012-0226463 A1 on Sep. 6, 2012.

The instant invention contemplates that in the embodiments of FIGS. 2-7,the RF energy collection and processing means 18 may be also providedwithout the memory 26 by way of utilizing memory of the devices 200, 300or 400.

While a presently preferred and various alternative embodiments of thepresent invention have been described in sufficient detail above toenable a person skilled in the relevant art to make and use the same itshould be obvious that various other adaptations and modifications canbe envisioned by those persons skilled in such art without departingfrom either the spirit of the invention or the scope of the appendedclaims.

We claim:
 1. An integrated circuit comprising: (a) a die manufacturedfrom a semiconducting material; (b) a radio frequency (RF) energycollection and processing means disposed on or within said die andincluding at least a receiver receiving an emission of RF energy and aprocessing means processing a signature of said emission in time andfrequency domains, so as to determine one or more anomalous operatingcharacteristics of said integrated circuit attributable to saidemission; (c) an input configured to supply power to said RF energycollection and processing means; and (d) an output for operativecommunication by said RF energy collection and processing means.
 2. Theintegrated circuit of claim 1, further including another inputconfigured to program operation of said RF energy collection andprocessing means.
 3. The integrated circuit of claim 1, wherein said dieis a first die, wherein said integrated circuit further includes atleast one circuit and at least one discrete component disposed on one ofsaid first die and a second die and wherein said RF energy collectionand processing means is responsive to the RF energy emitted by at leastone of said at least one circuit and said at least one discretecomponent.
 4. The integrated circuit of claim 3, wherein said RF energycollection and processing means detects tampering with said at least onecircuit and said at least one discrete component by a focused ion beamtechnology.
 5. The integrated circuit of claim 3, wherein said RF energycollection and processing means detects tampering with said second dieby a focused ion beam technology.
 6. The integrated circuit of claim 3,wherein said RF energy collection and processing means detects tamperingwith said second die that is integrated and encapsulated into a physicalcomponent package having said first die disposed therewithin.
 7. Theintegrated circuit of claim 3, wherein said RF energy collection andprocessing means detects at least one of modification of and tamperingwith software and firmware operating within said integrated circuit. 8.The integrated circuit of claim 3, wherein said RF energy collection andprocessing means is configured to detect at least one of tampering withand counterfeiting of at least one of said at least one circuit and saidat least one discrete component.
 9. The integrated circuit of claim 3,wherein said RF energy collection and processing means is configured todetect tampering with said first die.
 10. The integrated circuit ofclaim 1, mounted on a circuit board assembly and wherein said RF energycollection and processing means is responsive to the RF energy emittedby at least one component on said circuit board assembly.
 11. Theintegrated circuit of claim 10, wherein said RF energy collection andprocessing means is configured to detect at least one of tampering withand counterfeiting of said at least one component on said circuit boardassembly.
 12. The integrated circuit of claim 10, wherein said RF energycollection and processing means is configured to detect degradation ofsaid at least one component.
 13. The integrated circuit of claim 1,mounted within an electrical device including at least one circuit boardassembly and wherein said RF energy collection and processing means isconfigured to detect at least one of tampering with and counterfeitingof said at least one circuit board assembly or an at least one componentmounted thereon.
 14. The integrated circuit of claim 12, wherein said RFenergy collection and processing means monitors said at least onecomponent mounted on said circuit board assembly having said at leastone circuit mounted thereon.
 15. The integrated circuit of claim 1,further including an antenna in operative coupling with said RF energycollection and processing means.
 16. The integrated circuit of claim 15,wherein said antenna is disposed on or within said die.
 17. Theintegrated circuit of claim 15, further including at least one circuitand/or at least one discrete component mounted on said die in a spacedapart relationship with said RF energy collection and processing meansand wherein said at least one antenna encases said at least one circuitand/or said at least one discrete component and is coupled to said RFenergy collection and processing means.
 18. A device comprising: (a) atleast one antenna; (b) a first die including a first integrated circuithaving a radio frequency (RF) energy collection and processing meansdisposed on or within said first die, said RF energy collection andprocessing means including a receiver receiving an emission of RFenergy, a processing means processing a signature of said emission intime and frequency domains, so as to determine one or more anomalousoperating characteristics of said integrated circuit attributable tosaid emission, and a data storage means; (c) at least one second diehaving a second integrated circuit disposed thereon; and (d) aninterface of said first die and said at least one second die withselected connection input and output pins of said first integratedcircuit.
 19. The device of claim 18, wherein said RF energy collectionand processing means continuously monitors RF energy emissions from saidat least one second die having said another integrated circuit andmonitors changes in characteristics of said RF energy emissions fromsaid at least one second die.
 20. The device of claim 18, wherein saidRF energy collection and processing means is operable to determine,based on said signature, at least one of a tampering with said device, aperformance degradation of said device, changes to a software and/or afirmware operating within said device, a counterfeiting of said deviceand a failure of said device.
 21. The device of claim 20 wherein saiddevice is configured to self-predict Remaining Useful Lifetime (RUL) ofat least one of said first die and said at least one second die.
 22. Thedevice of claim 20, further including means for destroying operation ofsaid device in an event of tampering with at least one of hardware,firmware and software provided and/or operating within said device. 23.The device of claim 18, wherein said at least one antenna encases saidRF energy collection and processing means.
 24. An integrated circuitcomprising: (a) a die manufactured from a semiconducting material; (b) aradio frequency (RF) energy collection and processing means disposed onor within said die and including at least a receiver receiving anemission of RF energy and a processing means processing a signature ofsaid emission; (c) an input configured to supply power to said RF energycollection and processing means; and (d) an output for an operativecommunication by said RF energy collection and processing means, saidoutput is configured to indicate two states of said RF energy collectionand processing means, whereby one state is indicative of said emissionsignature substantially matching a predetermined standard and whereby asecond state is indicative of said emission signature deviating fromsaid predetermined standard.
 25. An integrated circuit comprising: (a) afirst die manufactured from a semiconducting material; (b) a radiofrequency (RF) energy collection and processing means disposed on orwithin said first die and including at least a receiver receiving anemission of RF energy and a processing means processing a signature ofsaid emission; (c) an input configured to supply power to said RF energycollection and processing means; (d) a second die manufactured from saidsemiconducting material; (e) at least one circuit and at least onediscrete component disposed on one of said first die and said seconddie; (f) wherein said energy collection and processing means isresponsive to RF energy emitted by at least one of said at least onecircuit and said at least one discrete component; and (g) wherein saidRF energy collection and processing means detects one of tampering withsaid at least one circuit and said at least one discrete component by afocused ion beam technology, tampering with said second die by a focusedion beam technology, tampering with said second die that is integratedand encapsulated into a physical component package having said first diedisposed therewithin, at least one of modification of and tampering withsoftware and firmware operating within said at least one circuit,counterfeiting of at least one of said at least one circuit and said atleast one discrete component, and tampering with said first die.
 26. Acircuit board assembly comprising: (a) a die manufactured from asemiconducting material; (b) a radio frequency (RF) energy collectionand processing means disposed on or within said die and including atleast a receiver receiving an emission of RF energy and a processingmeans processing a signature of said emission; (c) an input configuredto supply power to said RF energy collection and processing means; (d)an output for an operative communication by said RF energy collectionand processing means; and (e) wherein said RF energy collection andprocessing means is responsive to RF energy emitted by at least onecomponent on said circuit board assembly to monitor said at least onecomponent and/or to detect at least one of a tampering with, acounterfeiting of and a degradation of said at least one component onsaid circuit board assembly.
 27. An integrated circuit comprising: (a) adie manufactured from a semiconducting material; (b) a radio frequency(RF) energy collection and processing means disposed on or within saiddie and including at least a receiver receiving an emission of RF energyand a processing means processing a signature of said emission; (c) aninput configured to supply power to said RF energy collection andprocessing means; (d) an output for an operative communication by saidRF energy collection and processing means; and (e) wherein said RFenergy collection and processing means detects, based on said signature,at least one electromagnetic signature anomaly in at least one of saiddie, another integrated circuit, an electronic component provided onsaid and/or within said another integrated circuit, a circuit boardincluding at least one of said die, said another integrated circuit, andsaid electronic component, an assembly of several circuit boardsincluding at least one of said die, said another integrated circuit, andsaid electronic component or a fully assembled product including atleast one of said die, said another integrated circuit, said electroniccomponent, and said assembly of several circuit boards.
 28. Theintegrated circuit of claim 27, wherein said at least oneelectromagnetic signature anomaly is a result of at least one of changesto hardware, changes to firmware and changes to software provided and/oroperating in said at least one of said die, said another integratedcircuit, said electronic component, said assembly of several circuitboards and said fully assembled product.
 29. A device comprising: (a) atleast one antenna; (b) a first die including a first integrated circuithaving a radio frequency (RF) energy collection and processing meansdisposed on or within said first die, said RF energy collection andprocessing means including a receiver receiving an emission of RFenergy, a processing means processing a signature of said emission and adata storage means; (c) at least one second die having a secondintegrated circuit disposed thereon; (d) an interface of said first dieand said at least one second die with selected connection input andoutput pins of said first integrated circuit; and (e) wherein said (RF)energy collection and processing means is operable, based on saidsignature, to determine at least one of a tampering with said device, aperformance degradation of said device, changes to a software and/or afirmware operating within said device, a counterfeiting of said deviceand a failure of said device.